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The Roberts Court, extant for eleven years, has acquired the pejorative 
moniker, the “Corporate Court.”1 In the same short time span, the Court has 
repeatedly landed in the doghouse with constitutional scholars for its 
blunderbuss use of the First Amendment to invalidate key laws, including 
those regulating money in politics.2 (Maybe the Court’s next nickname 
should be the “Democracy Slayer.”) At times these aspects of ill repute 
intersect, as in the nearly universally reviled Citizens United decision granting 
corporations the constitutional right to spend an unlimited amount of 
corporate money on political ads in American elections.3 
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Empirical studies of the Supreme Court show that both negative 
reputations are richly deserved. As Judge Richard Posner and his co-authors 
showed in 2013, five of the most pro-business Justices since the mid-twentieth
 
century served on the Roberts Supreme Court, and Justices Roberts and Alito 
are the two most pro-business Justices since 1946.4 Moreover, a recent study 
by Harvard Law Professor John Coates showed, “[n]early half of First 
Amendment legal challenges now benefit business corporations and trade 
groups, rather than other kinds of organizations or individuals.”5 
Unfortunately, the Court’s use of the First Amendment as a deregulatory 
tool is not unique to its campaign finance cases. The Court’s corporate speech 
jurisprudence is also grounded in a deregulatory First Amendment, which 
further undermines the ability of the government to regulate the economic 
marketplace. Although the unexpected passing of Justice Scalia in early 2016 
might reset the path of the Supreme Court away from its pro-corporate  
anti-democratic trajectory, much is contingent on who the new Justice is.6 In 
the meantime, as the U.S. Senate stalls on the confirmation process for a 
replacement Justice, corporate lawyers in the lower courts have shown no 
reluctance in trying to build on the Roberts Court precedents that have 
expanded corporate rights in the past decade. A case in point is Apple, Inc.’s 
tussle with the FBI. 
In early 2016, a fight over a cell phone showed once again that corporations 
are eager to assert new and aggrandized corporate constitutional rights. The 
fact that this battle centers on a cell phone is no surprise as this technology 
has become a staple of modern life and a contested territory for law 
enforcement—who want to use the digital records in the phones as evidence 
in criminal cases—while individuals entrust more and more of their personal 
life and internal thoughts to these devices with a certain expectation of 
privacy. As Chief Justice Roberts once wrote: “modern cell phones . . . are 
now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor 
from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”7 
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In 2016, a battle between two titans, the FBI and Apple, flared over 
whether a judge could order Apple to create a program to unlock the iPhone 
of the dead San Bernardino gunman.8 Apple refused, asserting that building 
such an end-run around its encryption would make all Apple phones more 
vulnerable.9 The FBI argued Apple’s cooperation was needed in an  
anti-terrorism investigation.10 The case ended when the FBI found a third 
party to unlock the iPhone in question for them without Apple’s assistance.11 
But, in its opposition to the government’s request for help, Apple asserted a 
particularly grand set of corporate constitutional rights, which if accepted by 
the courts, could have further undermined the government’s ability to 
regulate the economic market, which is increasingly digital and where the 
coin of the realm is data. 
As I discuss in my book, Corporate Citizen?, presently corporations in 
America are enjoying a bizarre confluence of solicitude from U.S. courts.12 
Citizens United (granting corporations more political rights) and Hobby Lobby 
(allowing for corporations to avoid the responsibility to pay for certain 
healthcare) have stolen the headlines,13 but other lesser known cases like 
Sorrell v. IMS Health have also been indicative of this phenomenon.14 
Historically, corporate lawyers have been first in line to claim 
constitutional rights for their incorporeal clients. Whether it was protection 
of property rights in Terrett in 1815, or coverage of the Constitution’s 
Contracts Clause in Dartmouth College in 1819, corporations were both early 
litigants and early winners.15 After the Civil War, corporations raced to the 
courthouse to assert rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
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protection and due process clauses.16 Corporations have also become greedy 
for First Amendment rights. Two cases from the 1970s set this approach 
barreling downhill like a runaway train: Virginia Pharmacy, which granted 
commercial advertisements First Amendment protection, and Bellotti, which 
granted corporations the right to spend in ballot initiative fights.17 
Uncharacteristically for a corporation, Apple was actually on the side of 
personal privacy in the Apple versus FBI fight. But typically, corporate 
interests and personal privacy interest are not so neatly aligned. Often the 
corporate interest is to squeeze personal information out of every transaction, 
repackage it, and sell it. As Professor Frank Pasquale notes, “personal data 
markets [are] a $156-billion-a-year industry.”18 In our information-based 
economy, a free speech doctrine that protects data and information as 
“speech” has incredible deregulatory potential.19 And, as privacy experts have 
warned for years, once data is in the hands of a private company, it’s that 
much easier for the government to get its hands on it, too.20 
Privacy advocates should rejoice that the Apple/FBI imbroglio is not 
being litigated to the Supreme Court because of a little noticed case from 
Vermont in 2011 called Sorrell v. IMS Health in which the Court ruled against 
a Vermont law that kept doctor’s prescription records out of the hands of 
corporate drug representatives. 
In Sorrell, the issue was that drug representatives, also known as “detail 
men,” were using doctors’ prescription habits to brow beat doctors into 
prescribing more of their particular drugs.21 The law allowed academics to 
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have access to prescription records, but disallowed the sale of the data for 
commercial uses.22 Three data mining firms (IMS Health, Verispan, and 
Source Healthcare Analytics) sued claiming that the law violated the First 
Amendment rights of the companies.23 The Supreme Court invalidated the 
Vermont law that had protected prescription data from commercial uses. 
Vermont had argued that data mining was merely conduct, not  
speech. An appeals court below accepted this argument: “[T]he First Circuit 
has characterized prescriber-identifying information as a mere  
‘commodity’ with no greater entitlement to First Amendment protection 
than ‘beef jerky.’”24 The majority of the Supreme Court rejected this 
characterization, noting: “dissemination of information [is] speech within the 
meaning of the First Amendment. Facts, after all, are the beginning point for 
much [] speech.”25 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Supreme Court majority in Sorrell, 
concluded the Vermont law was unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment, “[o]n its face, Vermont’s law enacts content-and speaker-based 
restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying 
information . . . . The law on its face burdens disfavored speech by disfavored 
speakers.”26 The majority thought of the law not as a protection of the privacy 
of patients, but rather as a form of targeted government censorship. Previous 
cases had given commercial speech less robust protections than political 
speech. In Sorrell, the Court reduced the saliency of this important 
distinction. Justice Kennedy established in Sorrell: “[a] consumer’s concern 
for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his 
concern for urgent political dialogue.”27 
One big loser in Sorrell was personal privacy. As Professor Wilson Huhn 
summarized, in Sorrell, “the Court found that the interest of the public in 
receiving information about matters of public interest trumps the privacy 
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interests of private citizens.”28 But the biggest loser in Sorrell was Vermont, 
and more generally, lawmakers. As Professor Jedediah Purdy has explained: 
[T]he First Amendment has helped the Supreme Court do for the consumer 
capitalism of the Information Age what freedom of contract did for the 
Industrial Age: constitutionally protect certain transactions that lie at the 
core of the economy. This makes unequal economic power much harder for 
democratic lawmaking to reach . . . .29 
 Corporations have enjoyed an odd combination of winning rights 
previously reserved for citizens, while simultaneously being excused from 
responsibilities that attach to citizenship. This “heads I win, tails you lose” 
approach for corporate actors needs to be rethought. And the vacancy left by 
Justice Scalia’s death affords the Supreme Court a chance to take a different 
path that places individuals in pride of place in our democratic system. Apple 
argued that what was wrong with the court order to assist the FBI was that 
“[t]his amounts to compelled speech and viewpoint discrimination in 
violation of the First Amendment”30 and it “violates Apple’s substantive due 
process right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of [its] liberty by 
government.”31 For now Apple’s fight with the FBI is over. But the 
arguments that Apple made in its briefs are likely to pop up again in future 
corporate litigations. These arguments could end up further magnifying 
corporate constitutional rights, and reducing the ability of the government to 
regulate corporate actors. Next time, I doubt the public will be lucky enough 
to have the corporate interests and personal privacy interests overlap as much 
as they did in the now terminated Apple litigation.  
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